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Abstract. We propose new constructions for inner product encryption
– IPE1 and IPE2, both secure under the eXternal Diffie-Hellman as-
sumption (SXDH) in asymmetric pairing groups. The first scheme has
constant-size ciphertexts whereas the second one is weakly attribute hid-
ing. IPE2 is derived from the identity-based encryption scheme of Jutla
Roy (Asiacrypt 2013), that was extended from tag-based quasi-adaptive
non-interactive zero-knowledge (QA-NIZK) proofs for linear subspaces of
vector spaces over bilinear groups. The verifier common reference string
(CRS) in these tag-based systems are split into two parts, that are com-
bined during verification. We consider an alternate form of the tag-based
QA-NIZK proof with a single verifier CRS that already includes a tag,
different from the one defining the language. The verification succeeds as
long as the two tags are unequal. Essentially, we embed a two-equation
revocation mechanism in the verification. The new QA-NIZK proof sys-
tem leads to IPE1, a constant-sized ciphertext IPE scheme with very
short ciphertexts. Both the IPE schemes are obtained by applying the n-
equation revocation technique of Attrapadung and Libert (PKC 2010) to
the corresponding identity based encryption schemes and proved secure
under SXDH assumption. As an application, we show how our schemes
can be specialised to obtain the first fully secure identity-based broad-
cast encryption based on SXDH with a trade-off among the public pa-
rameters, ciphertext and key sizes, all of them being sub-linear in the
maximum number of recipients of a broadcast.
Keywords: inner-product encryption, attribute-hiding, constant-size ci-
phertexts, quasi-adaptive non-interactive zero knowledge proofs.
1 Introduction
Inner product encryption (IPE) is a special form of the more general attribute-
based encryption (ABE), which provides fine-grained access control to encrypted
data. In ABE, a ciphertext is encrypted to some attribute x and a secret key is
associated to some attribute y such that decryption succeeds iff some relation
R on x,y holds true i.e., R(x,y) = 1. The standard notion of security for
ABE requires resistance to collusion attacks. More precisely, the privacy of a
message encrypted to attribute x must not be compromised in the event of
an attack by a group of users possessing secret keys for y1,y2, . . . ,yq where
R(x,yi) = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , q. Another useful security property, called weak
attribute hiding, requires that given a ciphertext, the group of corrupt users
unauthorised to decrypt the ciphertext, learn nothing about the attribute x. In
both cases, adaptive security allows users to be corrupted adaptively.
A simple form of ABE is identity-based encryption, where x and y represent
identities and the relation R tests equality of identities. IPE is a more complex
form with R testing orthogonality of x and y that are vectors in some inner prod-
uct space. In other words, R(x,y) = 1 if 〈x,y〉 = 0 and 0 otherwise. Though they
appear restricted, inner products cover a wide range of functionalities useful in
practice including polynomial functions, boolean formulae evaluating conjunc-
tive and disjunctive normal forms, and identity-based broadcast encryption and
revocation.
Most efficient constructions of IPE are based on pairings. A pairing e : G1 ×
G2 → GT is a bilinear, non-degenerate and efficiently computable map defined
over three groups G1,G2,GT all having the same order. The common order of
the groups may be composite or prime. Prime order pairings where G1 6= G2 are
called asymmetric. The best choices for implementation are asymmetric pairings,
particularly those with no efficiently computable isomorphisms between G1 and
G2 (called Type-3 pairings), from a point of view of security as well as efficiency.
A consequence of the absence of efficient isomorphisms makes the decisional
Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem hard in both groups G1 and G2, collectively
called the symmetric eXternal decisional Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) problem. We
mainly focus on security under this assumption.
A powerful technique to obtain adaptive security for attribute-based encryp-
tion schemes is the dual system methodology introduced by Waters [Wat09].
Important features of the underlying algebraic structure that facilitate a dual
system proof are cancelling and parameter-hiding. These features are explic-
itly available in composite order pairing groups that are not really suitable for
practical deployment. A number of works have investigated the possibilities of
translating the properties of composite order pairings to the prime-order setting,
mostly in the context of dual system hierarchical IBE and ABE. However, the
constructions resulting from these translations are not necessarily optimised in
terms of various system parameters (such as ciphertext/key size, time required
for decryption and so on). In contrast, direct constructions in the prime-order
setting circumventing the route via composite order pairings, holds more promise
in this regard. We believe that IPE as a cryptographic primitive is significant
enough to justify attempts for direct constructions.
The goal of this work is to obtain new direct Type-3 pairing-based construc-
tions of IPE that are efficient, adaptively secure with a focus on achieving either
of the following properties – attribute-hiding or compact ciphertexts – from the
SXDH assumption.
Our Contributions. We propose two new IPE schemes based on prime-order
pairings named IPE1 and IPE2 – the former with constant-sized ciphertexts
and the latter achieving weak attribute hiding, both secure under the SXDH
assumption. The constructions are derived from quasi-adaptive non-interactive
zero knowledge (QA-NIZK) proofs of Jutla and Roy [JR13] and an IBE proposed
in the same work (denoted JR -IBE in the rest of the paper). IPE2 is obtained
from JR -IBE by a novel application of the n-equation revocation technique of
Attrapadung and Libert [AL10]. But a constant-size ciphertext IPE cannot be
constructed in a similar way from JR -IBE . To get around this problem, we pro-
pose a small tweak to the Jutla-Roy QA-NIZK proofs that leads to an alter-
nate form of JR -IBE (named JR -IBE-D). The n-equation revocation method is
then combined with JR -IBE-D to construct IPE1. QA-NIZK proofs were only
known to yield IBE [JR13] , hierarchical IBE (HIBE) [RS14b] and identity-
based broadcast encryption [RS14a] but the question of whether they are useful
in constructing other forms of ABE remained open. Thus, we (partially) settle
an open question posed in [CGW15].
Tables 1 and 2 compare our constructions to those recently proposed by
Chen, Gay and Wee [CGW15]. The reason we do not include other previous
constructions in the comparison is that the constructions in [CGW15] are the
most efficient instantiations known so far and their constructions achieve security
from the SXDH assumption. First, we define some abbreviations/notation we use
in the comparison. #pp, #cpr and #key denote the sizes of public parameters,
ciphertexts and keys respectively. #dec denotes the time required for decryption.
|X| denotes the size of representation of an element from X. [P], [Mi] (for i =
1, 2) and [E] respectively denote the time required for pairing operation, scalar
multiplication in Gi (for i = 1, 2) and exponentiation in GT respectively.
Scheme #pp #cpr #key #dec
[CGW15] (2n + 4)|G1|+ |GT | 4|G1|+ |GT | (2n + 2)|G2| 4[P] + 2n[M2]
IPE1 (n + 3)|G1|+ |GT | 3|G1|+ |Zp|+ |GT | (2n + 1)|G2|+ (n− 1)|Zp| 3[P] + (2n− 2)[M2] + [E]
Table 1. Constant-size ciphertext IPE.
Scheme #pp #cpr #key #dec
[CGW15] (2n + 4)|G1|+ |GT | (2n + 2)|G1|+ |GT | 4|G2| 4[P] + 2n[M1]
IPE2 (n + 3)|G1|+ |GT | (n + 1)|G1|+ (n− 1)|Zp|+ |GT | 5|G2| 3[P] + (n + 1)[M1]
Table 2. Attribute-hiding IPE.
Note that both our schemes are at least as efficient as the corresponding in-
stantiations in [CGW15]. The public parameters and decryption time are better
in our schemes. The ciphertext size in both IPE1 and IPE2 are at least as short
as those in [CGW15].
Quasi-Adaptive NIZK Proofs to IPE. Jutla and Roy [JR13] proposed con-
structions of quasi-adaptive non-interactive zero knowledge (QA-NIZK) proofs
for linear equations over pairing groups that have a weaker soundness criterion
called quasi-adaptive soundness. The difference with regular NIZKs is that the
common reference string (CRS) is allowed to depend on the language. These
are useful in constructing a number of primitives, such as signatures, CCA2-
secure public key encryption, commitment schemes and so on. From the signa-
ture scheme, they obtained an IBE using Naor’s transform, which is the most
efficient IBE known till date in terms of size of public parameters and cipher-
texts achieving adaptive security under standard assumptions. Building upon
this IBE, we obtain a weakly attribute hiding IPE scheme using the n-equation
revocation method proposed in [AL10].
The NIZK construction that leads to the IBE is actually a split-CRS NIZK
for tag-based languages, where the CRS for the verifier is split into two com-
ponents. These two components are then combined using a public random tag
ctag, which is also a parameter defining the language. We make a slight modifi-
cation by combining the two components of the split-CRS with another tag ktag
and only providing the combination as the CRS. This ensures that verification
is successful unless the two tags are equal, thus making unconditional failure
of verification a possibility. Nevertheless, the probability of failure is negligible
and this small modification leads to an IBE scheme that has tags in both ci-
phertexts and keys. Decryption requires the two-equation revocation technique
of Sahai and Waters [LSW08] as used in Waters’ IBE [Wat09] and fails uncondi-
tionally with (negligible) probability equal to that of NIZK verification failure.
The resulting IBE which we denote as JR -IBE-D, allows extension to primitives
that were not possible from JR -IBE , such as identity-based revocation schemes
with small secret keys, constant-size ciphertext IBBE and so on. We present a
construction of constant-size ciphertext IPE that can then be specialised to the
afore-mentioned primitives. Unlike earlier constructions based on dual pairing
vector spaces, specialising the IPE to specific cases actually leads to optimal
constructions, i.e., these schemes are as efficient as direct constructions obtained
from JR -IBE-D.
The reason for first constructing an IBE is two-fold. Firstly, it provides better
intuition and acts as a basis for moving to inner product functionality. Second
and most importantly, we do not know a direct generic transformation from
QA-NIZK proofs to IBE, let alone IPE. To this end, there has been some recent
work [JR15] that defines the so-called dual system simulation sound QA-NIZK
proofs that explain the JR -IBE construction better in generic terms. It may be
possible to explain our constructions too within this framework.
Application. As an application of IPE, we consider identity-based broadcast
encryption (IBBE) wherein the goal is to securely broadcast an encrypted mes-
sage to users associated with identities so that only a subset of privileged users
can decrypt the message. Unlike the public key broadcast setting where the num-
ber of public keys varies polynomially with the security parameter, the number
of valid identities in an IBBE are allowed to be exponential. Some direct con-
structions of adaptively secure constructions of IBBE schemes already exist in
the literature [GW09,AL10,RS14a]. Most of these schemes require the number
of privileged recipients for any broadcast to be bounded during setup (call this
bound n). Previous schemes had either constant-sized ciphertexts or constant-
sized keys with at least one out of public parameters, ciphertext, key having size
depending linearly on n.
We show how to construct an IBBE from IPE1 that achieves parameters,
ciphertexts and keys all having size sublinear in n while maintaining security
under static complexity assumptions. (Here, static means that the number of el-
ements in instance is a constant). Due to lack of space, we present this discussion
in Appendix C.
Related Work. There have been several constructions of attribute encryption
schemes based on pairings [SW05,GPSW06,OSW07,BSW07,Wat11,LW12], some
focussing only on inner product encryption [KSW08,OT09,OT10,AL10]. Lattice-
based constructions include ABE of [Boy13] for formulas and [GVW13,GGH+13]
for circuits. We are mostly interested in constructions based on bilinear maps
with prime order. Several approaches have been taken to constructing ABE
schemes in the prime order pairing setting, most of them attempting to
simulate properties of composite order pairings in suitably defined prime-
order counterparts. A widely used technique is based on dual pairing vector
spaces [OT08,OT09] which obtains all the nice theoretical properties but fails
to preserve efficiency. The sparse DPVS technique introduced in [OT11] uses
subgroups of sparse matrices (those mostly covered with zero entries) with the
hope of improving efficiency. But the conversions are no longer generic and
involve very complex security analysis. Another generic technique is that of
dual system groups [CW13] that provides more efficient translations in the con-
text of IBE. However, it does not extend to primitives that require anonymity
or attribute-hiding. Two works [Wee14,Att14] present unifying frameworks for
predicate encryption schemes fully secure within the dual system framework.
These frameworks were defined in the composite order setting and later trans-
lated to prime-order groups [CGW15,Att15]. The translations to prime-order
setting required additional restrictions on the structure of encodings that do
not hold for most encodings proposed in [Wee14,Att14]. A recent work [AC16]
provides a new instantiation of the encoding framework of [Att14] employing
dual system groups ([CW13,CGW15]), thus implying constructions for pred-
icate encryption in both composite-order and prime-order bilinear group set-
tings. This work also considers a relaxation of the information theoretic security
property used in [Att14,Att15] that allows covering a larger class of encodings.
On the other hand, the efficiency tradeoffs for the constructions in [CGW15]
and [AC16] are directly related to the underlying dual system groups (DSG) in-
stantiation. The DSG realisation in [CGW15] leads to very efficient constructions
in the prime-order setting for several predicates. Apart from translations from
composite-order groups, there have been attempts at direct constructions of cer-
tain simple primitives such as IBE and HIBE. The approach of [JR13] is via QA-
NIZK proofs. This was later extended to HIBE in [RS14b] and IBBE [RS14a].
Another interesting approach was to construct (H)IBE from message authentica-
tion codes (which is a symmetric primitive), examined in [BKP14]. But it is not
known whether or not the last method extends to attribute-based encryption.
2 Preliminaries
This section introduces some notation followed by a review of pairings and
related hardness assumptions. Also provided are definitions related to inner-
product encryption.
2.1 Notation
The notation x1, . . . , xk
R←− X indicates that elements x1, . . . , xk are sampled
independently from the set X according to some distribution R. We use U to
denote the uniform distribution. For a (probabilistic) algorithm A, y R←− A(x)
means that y is chosen according to the output distribution of A on input x.
A(x; r) denotes that A is run on input x with its internal random coins set to r.
For two integers a < b, the notation [a, b] represents the set {x ∈ Z : a ≤ x ≤ b}.
If G is a finite cyclic group, then G× denotes the set of generators of G.
We denote vectors in Znp by bold upright characters (e.g. x). Inner product
of two Znp -vectors x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn) is given by 〈x,y〉 =∑n
i=1 xiyi.
2.2 Asymmetric Pairings and Hardness Assumptions
A bilinear pairing ensemble is a 7-tuple G = (p,G1,G2,GT , e, P1, P2) where
G1 = 〈P1〉, G2 = 〈P2〉 are written additively and GT is a multiplicatively written
group, all having the same order p and e : G1 × G2 → GT (the pairing) is a
bilinear, non-degenerate and efficiently computable map. In a Type-3 pairing,
G1 6= G2 and no efficiently computable isomorphisms between G1 and G2 are
known. The constructions we provide are based on such pairings.
The assumptions based on which the security of our constructions is proven
are the decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumptions in groups G1 and G2, called
DDH1 and DDH2 respectively. Below, we describe these two assumptions. Tech-
nically speaking, the two assumptions are not in the standard form but can be
shown to be equivalent. The reason we use the alternate forms is that they suit
the requirements of our reductions and also to be in sync with the notation
in [JR13].
Let G = (p,G1,G2,GT , e, P1, P2) be an asymmetric pairing ensemble and A ,
a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A that outputs 0 or 1.
Assumption DDH1. Define a distribution D as follows: P1
U←− G×1 ; b, s
U←−
Zp, µ
U←− Zp; D = (G, P1, bP1, bsP1). The advantage of A in solving the DDH1
problem is given by
AdvDDH1G (A ) = |Pr[A (D, sP1) = 1]− Pr[A (D, (s+ µ)P1) = 1]|.
Essentially, A has to decide whether µ = 0 or µ ∈U Zp given (D, (s + µ)P1).
The (ε, t)-DDH1 assumption holds in G if for any adversary A running in time
at most t, AdvDDH1G (A ) ≤ ε.
Assumption DDH2. Let a distribution D be defined as follows: P2
U←− G×2 ,
r, c
U←− Zp, γ
U←− Zp;
D = (G, P2, rP2, cP2).
A ’s advantage in solving the DDH2 problem is given by
AdvDDH2G (A ) = |Pr[A (D, rcP2) = 1]− Pr[A (D, (rc+ γ)P2) = 1]|.
The (ε, t)-DDH2 assumption is that, for any t-time algorithm A , AdvDDH2G (A ) ≤
ε.
2.3 Inner Product Encryption (IPE)
Definition 1 (IPE). Let V denote a vector space of dimension n over a field F
and M denote the message space. An IPE scheme for inner products over V , is
defined by four probabilistic algorithms – Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen and Decrypt.
Setup(κ, n) Takes as input a security parameter κ and the dimension of V . It
outputs the public parameters PP and the master secret MSK.
KeyGen(MSK,y) On input a vector y ∈ V and the master secret MSK; this
algorithm outputs a secret key SKy for y.
Encrypt(PP,m,x) Takes as input a message m and an attribute vector x ∈ V
and outputs a ciphertext C.
Decrypt(PP, C,SKy) If 〈x,y〉 = 0, this algorithm returns the message m and ⊥
otherwise.
Correctness. The IPE scheme is said to satisfy the correctness condition if for
all vectors x,y ∈ V with 〈x,y〉 = 0 and for all m ∈ M, if (PP,MSK) R←−
Setup(κ, n), SKy
R←− KeyGen(MSK,y), C R←− Encrypt(PP,m,x), then Pr[m =
Decrypt(PP, C,SKy)] = 1.
Definition 2 (Security). The security definition for inner product encryp-
tion scheme that we consider is weak attribute hiding and adaptive security
against chosen plaintext attacks. It is formalised in terms of the following game
ind-wah-cpa between an adversary A and a challenger.
Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm of the IPE and gives the public
parameters to A .
Key Extraction Phase 1: A makes a number of key extraction queries adap-
tively. For a query on a vector y, the challenger responds with a key SKy.
Challenge: A provides two pairs of messages and attribute vectors m0, x̂0 and
m1, x̂1with the restriction that if y is queried in the key extraction phase 1, then
〈x̂0,y〉 6= 0 and 〈x̂1,y〉 6= 0. The challenger chooses a bit β uniformly at random
from {0, 1}, encrypts mβ to x̂β and returns the resulting ciphertext Ĉ to A .
Key Extraction Phase 2: A makes more key extraction queries with the
restriction that it cannot query a key for any vector y with 〈x̂0,y〉 = 0 or
〈x̂1,y〉 = 0.
Guess: A outputs a bit β′.
If β = β′, then A wins the game. The advantage of A in winning the
ind-wah-cpa is given by
Advind-wah-cpaIPE (A ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[β = β′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
The IPE scheme is said to be (ε, t, q)-IND-WAH-CPA secure if every t-time ad-
versary making at most q key extraction queries has Advind-wah-cpaIPE (A ) ≤ ε.
We also consider a slightly weaker form of adaptive security denoted
IND-CPA-security where attribute hiding property is not achieved. In the cor-
responding security game, denoted ind-cpa, x̂1 = x̂2 that is, there is only one
challenge attribute vector x̂.
3 Variant of Jutla-Roy Split-CRS NIZK Proof and IBE
In this section, we suggest a small modification to QA-NIZK proofs of Jutla
and Roy [JR13] and describe an IBE derived from it. We denote the IBE as
JR -IBE-D, the ‘d’ signifying a sort of ‘dual’ of the original scheme. JR -IBE-D
forms the basis of our IPE construction with short ciphertexts. Since the QA-
NIZK construction only points a way to the IBE construction, we provide an
informal description of the modification required without delving into details of
the construction or proof. For definitions and more details related to QA-NIZK
proofs we refer to [JR13].
We are mainly interested in NIZK proofs for languages that are linear sub-
spaces of vectors of G2-elements. [JR13] actually considers vectors over G1. Since
G1 has shorter representation compared to G2, we prefer the ciphertext compo-
nents to live in G1 and hence reverse the roles of G1 and G2 in our presentation.
A linear subspace language is parameterised by an t×m matrix A of G2-elements
and defined as
LA = {xTA | x ∈ Ztp}.
A NIZK proof system for this language is a collection of 4 algorithms
(K0,K1,P,V) where K0 generates the common parameters (group descriptions
for a pairing), K1 generates CRSp and CRSv, the prover and verifier CRS’s re-
spectively, P generates a proof given a witness x for a candidate ~Q ∈ LA and
V verifies that the proof is valid. Quasi-adaptiveness refers to the CRS being
allowed to depend on the parameter, (A in the above case). Three notions –
completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge – formalise the security require-
ments of a NIZK proof system. [JR13] starts with an efficient construction for
this language and then extends it to what they call the split-CRS QA-NIZK
system. The languages supported by such systems are characterised as
LA, ~A1, ~A2 = {x
T · [A| ~A1 + ctag · ~A2] | x ∈ Ztp, ctag ∈ Zp},
with A ∈ Gt×m2 , ~A1, ~A2 ∈ Gt2 are parameters defining the language. Writing A
as [Al|Ar] with Al ∈ Gt×t2 and Ar ∈ G
(m−t)×t
2 and assuming that the number
(m− t) of equations in excess of the number of unknowns can be verified by just
making additional randomised copies of the CRS [JR13], we only consider Al
in our descriptions. The algorithms of the split-CRS NIZK system are described
below.
K0: Generates the bilinear pairing parameters G = (p,G1,G2,GT , e, P1, P2).
K1: Generates CRS as
CRSp,0 =
[
Al| ~A1
] [ u1
b−1
]
CRSp,1 =
[
Al| ~A2
] [ u2
b−1
]
CRSv,0 =
 bu11
−b
P1 CRSv,1 =
 bu20
0
P1,
where u1,u2
U←− Ztp and b
U←− Z×p . Note that CRSv,0,CRSv,1 ∈ Gt+21 .
P: Suppose the candidate is ~Q = xT · [A| ~A1 + ctag · ~A2]. The proof is given by
~R = xT (CRSp,0 + ctag · CRSp,1).
V: Given a proof ~R for a candidate ~Q , the verifier checks whether
e
(
[~R | ~Q],CRSv,0 + ctag · CRSv,1
)
equals 1T , the identity of GT or not indicating validity of the proof or other-
wise, respectively. Here the pairing function e evaluated on vectors is nothing
but the product of the component-wise evaluations.
Our modification. We are now ready to propose our tweak to this split-
CRS NIZK system. Instead of combining the verifier CRS’s during verification,
consider providing only one verifier CRS defined as
CRSv = CRSv,0 + ktagCRSv,1
where ktag
U←− Zp is chosen in K1. Verification is now done by testing whether
e
(
[~R | ~Q],CRSv
) 1
(ctag−ktag)
is 1T only if ctag 6= ktag. Verification fails unconditionally if the two tags are
equal. The modification weakens the quasi-adaptive soundness criterion since
there is a probability that the verification algorithm fails. However, we make this
modification only to make a transition to attribute-based encryption. Whether
this NIZK system is actually useful for other purposes is beyond the scope of
this work.
IBE. We now present the identity-based encryption scheme obtained from the
above mentioned NIZK system.
Setup(κ): Let G = (p,G1,G2,GT , e, F1, F2) be a Type-3 pairing ensemble gen-
erated based on the security parameter κ. Choose P1
U←− G×1 , P2
U←− G×2 ,
b
U←− Z×p , α1, α2, u1, u2, v1, v2, w1, w2
U←− Zp and set U1 = (u1+bu2)P1, V1 =
(v1 + bv2)P1, W1 = (w1 + bw2)P1, gT = e(P1, P2)
α1+bα2 . The parameters are
given by
PP : (P1, bP1, U1, V1,W1, gT )
MSK : (P2, α1, α2, u1, u2, v1, v2, w1, w2)
Encrypt(PP,m, id): The ciphertext is given by C = (C0, C1, C2, C3, ctag) where
ctag, s
U←− Zp,
C0 = m · (gT )s,
C1 = sP1, C2 = sbP1, C3 = s(U1 + idV1 + ctagW1).
KeyGen(MSK, id) Compute the secret key SKid = (K1,K2,K3,K4,K5, ktag) as
follows.
r, ktag
U←− Zp,
K1 = rP2, K2 = (α1 + rw1)P2, K3 = (α2 + rw2)P2
K4 = r(u1 + idv1 + ktagw1)P2, K5 = r(u2 + idv2 + ktagw2)P2.
Decrypt(C,SKid): If ctag = ktag, return ⊥. Otherwise compute
A =
(
e(C3,K1)
e(C1,K4)e(C2,K5)
) 1
ctag−ktag
and recover the message as
m =
C0 ·A
e(C1,K2)e(C2,K3)
.
The message m can be recovered in a single step involving 3 pairing opera-
tions.
Decryption involves the two-equation revocation technique of Sahai and Wa-
ters [LSW08] that was also used in Waters IBE [Wat09]. The scheme is adaptively
secure under the SXDH assumption. Since JR -IBE-D is a special case of IPE1,
its security is implied by that of IPE1. Hence we omit the proof.
4 IPE with Short Ciphertexts
In this section, we define our first IPE construction IPE1 with constant-size
ciphertexts and show that it is adaptively secure. As mentioned earlier, we use
the n-equation revocation technique of Attrapadung and Libert [AL10] to extend
JR -IBE-D to support inner product encryption. Below is the description of the
algorithms of IPE1 = (IPE1.Setup, IPE1.Encrypt, IPE1.KeyGen, IPE1.Decrypt).
IPE1.Setup(κ, n): Generate a Type-3 pairing G = (p,G1,G2,GT , e, F1, F2) based
on the security parameter κ. Choose P1
U←− G×1 , P2
U←− G×2 , b
U←− Z×p ,
α1, α2, w1, w2
U←− Zp, u1 = (u1,1, . . . , u1,n),u2 = (u2,1, . . . , u2,n)
U←− Znp
and set u = (u1 + bu2)P1, w = (w1 + bw2), gT = e(P1, P2)
α1+bα2 . The
parameters are given by
PP : (P1, bP1,uP1, wP1, gT )
MSK : (P2, α1, α2,u1,u2, w1, w2)
IPE1.Encrypt(PP,m,x = (x1, . . . , xn)): Components of the ciphertext are com-
puted as follows.
ctag, s
U←− Zp,
C0 = m · (gT )s,
C1 = sP1, C2 = sbP1, C3 = s(〈x,u〉+ ctag · w)P1.
Note that C3 can be computed from uP1, wP1 and ctag using n + 1 scalar
multiplications. The ciphertext is given by C = (x, C0, C1, C2, C3, ctag).
IPE1.KeyGen(MSK,y = (y1, . . . , yn)): The secret key for y is given by SKy =
(K1,K2,K3, (K4,i,K5,i, ktagi)
n
i=2) where
r, (ktagi)
n
i=2
U←− Zp,
K1 = rP2, K2 = (α1 + rw1)P2, K3 = (α2 + rw2)P2
For i = 2, . . . , n,
K4,i = r(−u1,1 yiy1 + u1,i + ktagiw1)P2, K5,i = r(−u2,1
yi
y1
+ u2,i + ktagiw2)P2.
IPE1.Decrypt(C,SKy): Compute ktag =
∑n
i=2 xiktagi. If ctag = ktag, return ⊥.
Otherwise let
A =
(
e(C3,K1)e(C1,
n∑
i=2
xiK4,i)
−1e(C2,
n∑
i=2
xiK5)
−1
) 1
ctag−ktag
.
Recover the message as m = C0·Ae(C1,K2)e(C2,K3) . As in the IBE, decryption can
be done in a single step involving 3 pairings.
Correctness: Let C ←− IPE1.Encrypt(PP,m,x = (x1, . . . , xn); s) where
C = (x, C0, C1, C2, C3, ctag) and let SKy ←− IPE1.KeyGen(MSK,y =
(y1, . . . , yn); r) with SKy = (K1,K2,K3, (K4,i,K5,i, ktagi)ni=2). Suppose 〈x,y〉 =
0 and ktag =
∑n
i=2 xiktagi 6= ctag. First, we look at the computation of A. We
have
n∑
i=2
xiK4,i =
n∑
i=2
xir(−u1,1
yi
y1
+ u1,i + ktagiw1)P2
= r
(
−u1,1
y1
n∑
i=2
xiyi +
n∑
i=2
xiu1,i + w1
n∑
i=2
xiktagi
)
P2
= r
(
−u1,1
y1
(〈x,y〉 − x1y1) + 〈x,u1〉 − x1u1,1 + ktag · w1
)
P2
= r (〈x,u1〉+ ktag · w1)P2.
Similarly,
∑n
i=2 xiK5,i = r (〈x,u2〉+ ktag · w1)P2. Combining the two, we get
e(C1,
n∑
i=2
xiK4,i)e(C2,
n∑
i=2
xiK5) = e(P1, P2)
rs(〈x,u〉+ktag·w)
implying that
A =
(
e(C3,K1)e(C1,
n∑
i=2
xiK4,i)
−1e(C2,
n∑
i=2
xiK5)
−1
) 1
ctag−ktag
= e(P1, P2)
rsw.
The second stage of decryption recovers the message as shown below.
C0 ·A
e(C1,K2)e(C2,K3)
=
m · gsT ·A
e(sP1, (α1 + rw1)P2)e(sbP1, (α2 + rw2)P2)
=
m · e(P1, P2)(α1+bα2)s · e(P1, P2)rsw
e(P1, P2)(α1+bα2)se(P1, P2)rsw
= m
Before proving security, we describe algorithms that generate the necessary
semi-functional objects for a dual system proof. These are required only in the
proof.
IPE1.SFEncrypt(PP,MSK,m,x): Generate (C′ = (x, C0, C1, C2, C3, ctag))
R←−
IPE1.Encrypt(PP,m,x). Choose µ
U←− Zp and generate the semi-functional
ciphertext components as follows.
C0 ←− C0 · e(P1, P2)µα1 ,
C1 ←− C1 + µP1, C3 ←− C3 + µ(〈x,u1〉+ ctag · w1).
Return C = (x, C0, C1, C2, C3, ctag) as the resulting semi-functional cipher-
text.
IPE1.SFKeyGen(PP,MSK,y): Let SK′y = (K1,K2,K3, (K4,i,K5,i, ktagi)ni=2)
be obtained by running IPE1.KeyGen(MSK,y). Pick γ
U←− Zp and mod-
ify the components of SK′y as follows:
K2 ←− K2 + γP2, K3 ←− K3 − γbP2.
The semi-functional key given by SK′y = (K1,K2,K3, (K4,i,K5,i, ktagi)ni=2)
is returned as output.
For a given pair of ciphertext and key satisfying (ktag =
∑n
i=2 xiktagi) 6= ctag
and 〈x,y〉 = 0, decryption fails only when both are semi-functional since the
message will be blinded by e(P1, P2)
µγ . It is easy to see that the rest of the
semi-functional components get canceled.
We now prove that scheme IPE1 is adaptively secure, formalised in the the-
orem below.
Theorem 1. Scheme IPE1 is (q, ε, t)-IND-CPA-secure if the (εDDH1, t1)-DDH1
and (εDDH2, t2)-DDH2 assumptions hold in the underlying pairing description G
where ε ≤ εDDH1 + q · εDDH2 + (1/p) and t = max(t1, t2) − O(qρ), ρ being the
maximum cost of scalar multiplication in either G1 or G2.
Proof Sketch. Let G0 denote the real security game ind-cpa (defined in Sec-
tion 2.3). The proof proceeds though a sequence of games where we gradually
change the distribution of the keys and challenge ciphertext provided to the ad-
versary. At the end is the game where the attacker receives semi-functional en-
cryption of a random message. We first change the ciphertext to semi-functional
form and then the q keys provided as answers to the q queries to semi-functional
form. There are essentially three main parts in the reduction.
Distinguishing normal and semi-functional ciphertexts: We show that
an attacker’s ability to distinguish between normal and semi-functional ci-
phertexts can be leveraged to solve the DDH1 problem. This is clear from
the definition of semi-functional ciphertexts. P1, bP1 and sbP1 come from the
instance and are sufficient to simulate the correct environment. The DDH1
challenge is embedded in C1 which is either normal or semi-functional ac-
cording as the instance is real or random. Since no encoding of b is known in
G2, the simulator itself cannot create a semi-functional key and detect the
type of the challenge ciphertext.
Detecting the change of k-th key from normal to semi-functional:
This is the most crucial stage of the security reduction. Denote by y1, . . . ,yq
the queries made by the attacker. The first k − 1 keys returned are semi-
functional and the last q− k− 1 keys are normal. The simulator is designed
in a way that it can create both normal and semi-functional keys. The DDH2
challenge is embedded in the k-th key and particularly in component K2.
However, for the k-th key the simulator can only create a semi-functional
ciphertext with ctag =
∑n
i=2 xiktagi. This ensures that the simulator itself
cannot detect the type of k-th key and trivially solve DDH2. Furthermore,
the tags in the ciphertext and keys need to be uniformly and independently
distributed in the attacker’s view. This is achieved by setting them as
ĉtag
ktag2
...
ktagn
 =

−x̂1 −x̂2 −x̂3 · · · −x̂n
y2/y1 −1 0 · · · 0
y3/y1 0 −1 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
yn/y1 0 0 · · · −1


v2,1
v2,2
...
v2,n

where ĉtag is the tag associated with the challenge ciphertext for the chal-
lenge vector x̂ = (x̂1, . . . , x̂n) and ktag2, . . . , ktagn are the tags associated
with the secret key for yk. The matrix has determinant (−1)n〈x̂,yk〉/y1
which is non-zero because all of A ’s queries are such that 〈x̂,yk〉 6= 0.
(Here y1 is the first coordinate of yk). Hence all we need to do is choose
v2 = (v2,1, . . . , v2,n) uniformly from Znp and also hide v2 information theo-
retically from the attacker. v2 is in fact embedded in the master secret key
(and as a result in the public parameters) but masked by other additive
terms. The argument repeated q times for each query gives a degradation of
q in DDH2.
Distinguishing the real message from a random one: The last impor-
tant step is an information theoretic argument to show that the message
encrypted is random that is, the bit β is statistically hidden form the at-
tacker. This is done by changing the setup and semi-functional key genera-
tion algorithms in such a way that all information provided to the attacker
are independent of α1. The only component that depends on α1 is C0 of the
challenge ciphertext where the message has a blinding factor of e(P1, P2)
µα1 .
Since all other information is independent of α1,mβ ·e(P1, P2)µα1 is uniformly
distributed in GT and thus provides no hint to about β unless µ = 0 which
happens with probability 1/p.
Refer to Appendix A for details of the proof.
5 Weakly Attribute-Hiding IPE
In this section, we present our second IPE construction IPE2 for inner prod-
ucts over Znp . Unlike IPE1, this construction is based on JR -IBE . While
the n-equation revocation technique was used in [AL10] to obtain constant-
size ciphertexts forgoing attribute-hiding, we use it here to anonymise ci-
phertexts by incorporating the technique into the encryption algorithm. We
split the ciphertext component of JR -IBE containing the identity hash into
n − 1 components corresponding to the entries of the attribute vector x.
For decryption, the relation R(x,y) can be verified by combining the cipher-
text components using the secret vector y without knowing x. Let IPE2 =
(IPE2.Setup, IPE2.Encrypt, IPE2.KeyGen, IPE2.Decrypt) with the algorithms de-
scribed as below.
IPE2.Setup(κ, n): Generate a Type-3 pairing G = (p,G1,G2,GT , e, F1, F2) based
on the security parameter κ. Choose P1
U←− G×1 , P2
U←− G×2 , b
U←− Z×p ,
α1, α2, w1, w2
U←− Zp, u1,u2
U←− Znp and set u = u1 + bu2, w = w1 + bw2
and gT = e(P1, P2)
α1+bα2 . The parameters are given by
PP : (P1, bP1,uP1, wP1, gT )
MSK : (P2, α1, α2,u1,u2, w1, w2)
IPE2.Encrypt(PP,m,x = (x1, . . . , xn)): The ciphertext is given by the tuple C =
(C0, C1, C2, (C3,i, ctagi)
n
i=2) where
(ctagi)
n
i=2, s
U←− Zp,
C0 = m · (gT )s,
C1 = sP1, C2 = sbP1,
C3,i = s
(
− xix1u1 + ui + ctagiw
)
P1 for i = 2, . . . , n.
Since (uiP1)i∈[1,n] and wP1 are provided in PP, each C3,i can be computed
using 3 scalar multiplications.
IPE2.KeyGen(MSK,y = (y1, . . . , yn)): Secret key SKy = (K1,K2,K3,K4,K5)
is computed as follows.
r
U←− Zp,
K1 = rP2, K2 = (α1 + r〈y,u1〉)P2, K3 = (α2 + r〈y,u2〉)P2
K4 = rw1P2, K5 = rw2P2.
IPE2.Decrypt(C,SKy,y): Compute ctag =
∑n
i=2 yictagi. Recover the message
as follows.
m =
C0 · e(
∑n
i=2 yiC3,i,K1)
e(C1,K2 + ctagK4)e(C2,K3 + ctagK5)
.
Correctness. Let C R←− IPE2.Encrypt(PP,m,x = (x1, . . . , xn); s) and let
SKy
R←− IPE2.KeyGen(MSK,y = (y1, . . . , yn); r) where C, SKy are given by
(C0, C1, C2, (C3,i, ctagi)
n
i=2), SKy = (K1,K2,K3,K4,K5) respectively. Suppose
〈x,y〉 = 0 and ctag =
∑n
i=2 yictagi. Let A1 = e(
∑n
i=2 yiC3,i,K1) and A2 =
e(C1,K2 + ctagK4)e(C2,K3 + ctagK5). Decryption is correct if A2/A1 = (gT )
s.
We have
A1 = e
(
n∑
i=2
yiC3,i,K1
)
= e
(
n∑
i=2
yis
(
−xiu1
x1
+ ui + ctagiw
)
P1, rP2
)
= e
((
−(〈y,x〉 − x1y1)
u1
x1
+ 〈y,u〉 − y1u1 + ctag · w
)
P1, P2
)rs
= e (P1, P2)
rs(〈y,u〉+ctag·w)
,
and
A2 = e(C1,K2 + ctagK4)e(C2,K3 + ctagK5)
= e(sP1, (α1 + r〈y,u1〉)P2 + ctag · rw1P2)e(sbP1 (α2 + r〈y,u2〉)P2 + ctag · rw2P2)
= e (P1, (α1 + bα2)P2)
s
e (P1, r(〈y,u1〉+ b〈y,u2〉+ ctag(w1 + bw2))P2)s
= (gT )
s · e (P1, (〈y,u1 + bu2〉+ ctag · w)P2)rs
= (gT )
s · e (P1, P2)rs(〈y,u〉+ctag·w)
thus implying that A2/A1 = (gT )
s, as desired.
Security. The theorem below summarises the security guarantee we obtain for
IPE2.
Theorem 2. Scheme IPE2 is (q, ε, t)-IND-WAH-CPA-secure if the (εDDH1, t1)-
DDH1 and (εDDH2, t2)-DDH2 assumptions hold in the underlying pairing descrip-
tion G where ε ≤ εDDH1 + q · εDDH2 + (1/p) and t = max(t1, t2)−O(qρ), ρ being
the maximum cost of scalar multiplication in either G1 or G2.
The proof is more or less similar to the proof of Theorem 1 except for the
information theoretic argument in the last step. In addition to showing that
the blinding factor on the message is uniformly random in the attacker’s view,
we also need to prove that the attribute vector is hidden from the adversary.
The solution is to simulate the key extraction queries in such a way that all
information the attacker sees is independent of u1. Observe that u1 is part of the
master secret and would also be used to define the semi-functional components
for C3,i. With all keys and parameters being independent of u1, one can argue
that C3,i components are uniform and independent elements of G1 thus providing
no hint about which attribute vector the challenge ciphertext is encrypted to.
(This makes sense as the only ciphertext components determined by the attribute
vector are C3,i for i = 2, . . . , n). A detailed proof is provided in Appendix B.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is a hybrid argument over a sequence of q + 6 games G0, G1,
G2,G3,0, . . . ,G3,q, G4, G5 where G0 is the real ind-cpa attack game defined in
Section 2.3. Let X denote the event that the adversary A wins (i.e., β = β
′)
in G. The rest of the games are described below.
Game G1: This game is similar to G0 except for a modification to the Encrypt
algorithm. Elements from the master secret key MSK are used instead of the
public parameters. The challenge ciphertext is generated as follows.
ctag, s
U←− Zp,
C1 = sP1, C2 = sbP1, C3 = (〈x̂,u1〉+ ctag · w1)C1 + (〈x̂,u2〉+ ctag · w2)C2.
C0 = mβ · (C1, P2)α1e(C2, P2)α2 ,
It is straightforward to verify that C0 and C3 are well-formed. The change we
have made is only conceptual and hence G1 is identical to G0. Therefore, we have
Pr[X0] = Pr[X1]. (1)
Game G2: The challenge ciphertext generation in G1 is further modified to
obtain game G2. Component C1 is generated as C1
U←− G1. The rest of the steps
remain the same. We show that the ability of the adversary to detect this change
can be used to construct a DDH1-solver. More precisely we have the following.
Lemma 1. |Pr[X1]− Pr[X2]| ≤ εDDH1.
Game G3,0: We arrive at G3,0 by modifying the setup, key generation and
encryption procedures in G2 as follows.
Setup: The public parameters are generated as follows. Choose P1
U←−
G×1 , P2
U←− G×2 , α, α1, w, w1
U←− Zp, b
U←− Z×p , u,u1
U←− Znp , implicitly
setting u2 = b
−1(u − u1), w2 = b−1(w − w1) and α2 = b−1(α − α1). Set
gT = e(P1, P2)
α and PP = (P1, bP1,uP1, wP1, gT ).
Key Generation: On input a vector y, the KeyGen algorithm is modified to
create the components of SKy as shown below.
r, (ktagi)
n
i=2
U←− Zp,
K1 = rP2, K2 = (α1 + rw1)P2, K3 = b
−1 ((α+ rw)P2 −K2)
For i = 2, . . . , n,
K4,i = r(−u1,1 yiy1 + u1,i + ktagiw1)P2,
K5,i = b
−1
(
r(−u1 yiy1 + ui + ktagiw)P2 −K4,i
)
.
Encryption: The Encrypt algorithm is modified to use public parameters in-
stead of elements from the master secret (as in the construction). Further,
the challenge ciphertext is generated by a call to the SFEncrypt algorithm.
Essentially, the components of Ĉ are generated as follows.
ctag, s, µ
U←− Zp,
C0 = mβ · (gT )se(P1, P2)µα1 ,
C1 = sP1 + µP1, C2 = sbP1,
C3 = s(〈x,u〉+ ctag · w)P1 + µ(〈x,u1〉+ ctag · w1)P1.
It can be shown that the keys and Ĉ have the right form via simple calculations.
The changes we have made are only conceptual. Therefore, game G3,0 is identical
to G2 and we have
Pr[X2] = Pr[X3,0]. (2)
Game G3,k (for k = 1, . . . , q): Let y1, . . . ,yq be the vectors queried by A .
This game is identical to G3,k−1 except for the following two modifications. The
(k − 1)-st key is generated according to the SFKeyGen algorithm and SKyk for
the k-th vector yk is generated differently – component K2 of SKyk is now
chosen uniformly at random from G2. The first change is purely conceptual and
hence does not affect the adversary’s behaviour in any way. We show that if the
adversary can detect the second modification, then the DDH2 problem can be
solved. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 2. |Pr[X3,k−1]− Pr[X3,k]| ≤ εDDH2 for all k ∈ [1, q].
Game G4: Proceeds identical to G3,q but for one difference – the secret key
corresponding to yq is computed using the SFKeyGen algorithm. Since this is
only a conceptual change, we have
Pr[X3,q] = Pr[X4]. (3)
Game G5: This game is similar to G4 except for a modification of the SFKeyGen
algorithm. The setup remains same as defined in G3,0. Let y be the input to
SFKeyGen.
r, γ′
U←− Zp,
K1 = rP2, K2 = (γ
′ + rw1)P2, K3 = b
−1 ((α+ rw)P2 −K2)
The rest of the secret key components are generated as in G3,0. This implicitly
sets γ′ = α1 + γ and induces a uniform distribution on γ. Furthermore, all keys
are computed independent of α1 and so are the public parameters. As a result,
in the adversary’s view, e(P1, P2)
µα1 is randomly distributed in GT as long as
µ 6= 0 which happens with probability at most 1/p. Hence
|Pr[X4]− Pr[X5]| ≤ (1/p). (4)
The probability that A wins in G5, where mβ is masked by e(P1, P2)µα1 , is
exactly 1/2 as the bit b is information theoretically hidden from the attacker.
Therefore, from Lemmas 1, 2 and equations (1), (2), (3) and (4), we have
ε =
∣∣∣∣Pr[X0]− 12
∣∣∣∣
= |Pr[X0]− Pr[X5]|
≤ |Pr[X0]− Pr[X1]|+ |Pr[X1]− Pr[X2]|+ |Pr[X2]− Pr[X3, 0]|
+
(
q∑
k=1
|Pr[X3,k−1]− Pr[X3,k]|
)
+ |Pr[X3,q]− Pr[X4]|+ |Pr[X4]− Pr[X5]|
≤ εDDH1 + q · εDDH2 + (1/p)
ut
Proof (of Lemma 1). We build an algorithm B that can solve DDH1 if the adver-
sary A is able to distinguish between games G1 and G2. Let (G, P1, bP1, sbP1, (s+
µ)P1) be a DDH1 instance given to B. The task here is to decide whether µ = 0
or µ
U←− Zp. B simulates different phases of the game for A as follows.
Setup: The group description is same as G of the instance. Pick p2
U←− G×2 ,
u1,u2
U←− Znp , α1, α2, w1, w2
U←− Znp and generate the public parameters as:
uP1 = u1P1 + u2(bP1), wP1 = w1P1 + w2(bP1), gT = e(P1, P2)
α1e(bP1, P2)
α2 ,
where bP1 comes from the DDH1 instance.
Key Generation: Keys are generated normally via the KeyGen algorithm. B
does not know an encoding of b in G2 and hence cannot create a semi-functional
key and trivially win the game.
Challenge: A sends two messages m0,m1 and attribute vector x̂ to B. Pick
β
U←− {0, 1} and generate Ĉ = (C0, C1, C2, C3, ĉtag) as:
ĉtag
U←− Zp,
C0 = mβ · e(C1, P2)α1 · e(C2, P2)α2 ,
C1 = (s+ µ)P1, C2 = sbP1, C3 = (〈x,u1〉+ ctagw1)C1 + (〈x,u2〉+ ctagw2)C2,
where sbP1 comes from the DDH1 instance. Ĉ is distributed normally if µ = 0
and as a ciphertext in G2 in case µ
U←− Zp. This is because C1 is uniformly
distributed in group G1 if µ
U←− Zp. A returns a bit β′ as its guess of β to B.
If A wins (i.e., β = β′) B returns 1 and otherwise it returns 0. We have,
|Pr[X1]− Pr[X2]| = |Pr[β = β′ in G1]− Pr[β = β′ in G2]|
= |Pr[β = β′|µ = 0]− Pr[β = β′|µ U←− Zp]|
= |Pr[B returns 1|µ = 0]− Pr[B returns 1|µ U←− Zp]|
= AdvDDH1G (A )
≤ εDDH1
ut
Proof (of Lemma 2). If the attacker can distinguish between the two games
G3,k−1 and G3,k, then we show how to build an algorithm B that solves the
DDH2 problem. Let (G, P2, rP2, w1P2, (rw1 + γ)P2) be an instance of DDH2
provided to B whose task is to determine whether γ = 0 or γ
U←− Zp. The
different phases of the game are simulated as follows.
Setup: Choose P1
U←− G×1 , v1,v2
U←− Znp and implicitly set u1 = v1 + w1v2.
Observe that no encoding of u1 is available in G1. Nevertheless, the public pa-
rameters can be generated without using u1 or w1, as described in G3,0.
Key Generation: Denote by y1, . . . ,yq the vectors queried by A . Normal
keys can be generated as in G3,0. Note that B knows w1P2 and hence can
compute u1P2 which is required for generating components of a normal key. For
j = 1, . . . , q, key SKyj is generated as follows.
Case j < k: Use SFKeyGen to generate SKyj . This is possible since b is known
to B.
Case j = k: Create the key SKyk = (K1,K2,K3, (K4,i,K5,i, ktagi)ni=2) as fol-
lows. Let yk = (y1, . . . , yn).
For i = 2, . . . , n, set ktagi = (yi/y1)v2,1 − v2,i; pick r
U←− Zp ,
K1 = rP2,
K2 = α1P2 + (rw1 + γ)P2, K3 = b
−1 ((α− α1)P2 + wrP2 − (rw1 + γ)P2),
for i = 2, . . . , n,
K4,i =
(
− yiy1 v1,1 + v1,i
)
rP2, K5,i = b
−1
((
− yiy1u1 + ui
)
P2 −K4,i
)
.
Case j > k: B computes a normal key according to the KeyGen algorithm.
The following calculation shows that K4,i is well-formed.
K4,i =
(
− yi
y1
u1,1 + u1,i + ktagiw1
)
rP2
=
(
− yi
y1
(v1,1 + w1v2,1) + (v1,i + w1v2,i) +
(
yi
y1
v2,1 − v2,i
)
w1
)
rP2
=
(
− yi
y1
v1,1 + v1,i
)
rP2
Also, for a vector x that is orthogonal to yk, we have
ktag =
n∑
i=2
xiktagi
=
n∑
i=2
xi((yi/y1)v2,1 − v2,i)
= (v2,1/y1)
n∑
i=2
xiyi −
n∑
i=2
xiv2,i
= (v2,1/y1)(〈x,y〉 − x1y1)− (〈v2,x〉 − v2,1x1)
= −〈v2,x〉.
Challenge Phase: A provides two messages m0,m1 and a challenge vector
x̂ = (x̂1, . . . , x̂n). B picks β
U←− {0, 1} and generates the challenge ciphertext
Ĉ = (C0, C1, C2, C3, ĉtag) as follows.
s, µ
U←− Zp, ĉtag = −〈v2, x̂〉
C0 = mβ · e(P1, P2)sα · e(P1, P2)µα1 ,
C1 = sP1 + µP1, C2 = sbP1, C3 = s(〈u, x̂〉+ ctag · w)P1 + µ(〈v1,x〉)P2.
The semi-functional component of C3 is given by
µ(〈u1, x̂〉+ ĉtag · w1)P2 = µ(〈v1 + w1v2, x̂〉 − ĉtag · w1)P2
= µ(〈v1, x̂〉+ w1〈v2, x̂〉 − 〈v2, x̂〉w1)P2
= µ(〈v1, x̂〉)P2,
and hence C3 has the correct distribution. Another point to note is the following
– B does not know an encoding of w1 in G1. In order to generate a semi-
funtional ciphertext for a vector x. the only choice for ctag is −〈v2,x〉. This
helps in cancelling out the w1P1 component with the w1-portion of the hash
created using u1 = v1 + w1v2.
If γ = 0, k-th key is distributed as in G3,k−1; otherwise γ
U←− Zp and SKyk
is distributed as a semi-functional key. Furthermore, if B tries to create a ci-
phertext for a vector x that is orthogonal to yk, it can only do so by setting
ctag = −〈v2,x〉 = ktag. In this case decryption would fail unconditionally and
provide no information to B about the key for yk. What remains is to show
that all the information provided to A are properly distributed. The public
parameters are distributed as in the real scheme. Randomisers for the keys and
ciphertexts including their semi-functional components have the correct distribu-
tion. We only need to show that all the n tags – ĉtag of the challenge ciphertext
and ktag2, . . . , ktagn for the k-th secret key – generated using v2, are randomly
distributed in Zp. The tags are defined in the reduction as follows.
ĉtag
ktag2
...
ktagn
 =

−x̂1 −x̂2 −x̂3 · · · −x̂n
y2/y1 −1 0 · · · 0
y3/y1 0 −1 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
yn/y1 0 0 · · · −1


v2,1
v2,2
...
v2,n

All information provided to the adversary, including public parameters are com-
puted independent of v2. Since v2 is chosen uniformly from Znp , the tags are
uniformly distributed in the adversary’s view if the determinant of the matrix
above is non-zero. It is easy to observe that determinant is (−1)n〈x̂,yk〉/y1 which
is non-zero because all of A ’s queries are such that 〈x̂,yk〉 6= 0. Therefore, the
simulation is perfect. ut
B Proof of Theorem 2
We first describe the semi-functional ciphertext and key generation algorithms
required for the proof.
IPE2.SFEncrypt(PP,MSK,m,x): Generate (C′ =
(C0, C1, C2, (C3,i, ctagi)
n
i=2))
R←− IPE2.Encrypt(PP,m,x). Choose µ
U←− Zp
and generate the semi-functional ciphertext components as follows.
C0 ←− C0 · e(P1, P2)µα1 ,
C1 ←− C1 + µP1,
C3,i ←− C3,i + µ
(
− xix1u1,1 + u1,i + ctagiw1
)
P1 for i = 2, . . . , n.
Return C = (C0, C1, C2, C3, (C3,i, ctagi)ni=2)) as the resulting semi-functional
ciphertext.
IPE2.SFKeyGen(PP,MSK,y): Let SK′y = (K1,K2,K3,K4,K5) be obtained
by running IPE2.KeyGen(MSK,y). Pick γ, π
U←− Zp and modify the com-
ponents of SK′y as follows:
K2 ←− K2 + γπP2, K3 ←− K3 − γπb P2,
K4 ←− K4 + γP2, K5 ←− K5 − γbP2.
The semi-functional key given by SK′y = (K1,K2,K3,K4,K5) is returned
as output.
When a semi-functional ciphertext is decrypted with a semi-functional key, the
message is blinded by a factor e(P1, P2)
µγ(π+ctag) as a result of pairing C1 with
K2 +ctagK4, the rest of the semi-functional terms being canceled. If the relation
π = −ctag holds, then decryption succeeds. In this case, we call the ciphertext
and key nominally semi-functional.
The proof is a hybrid argument over a sequence of q + 6 games G0, G1, G2,
G3,0, . . . ,G3,q, G4, G5 where G0 is the real ind-wah-cpa attack game defined in
Section 2.3. Let X denote the event that the adversary A wins (i.e., β = β
′)
in G. The rest of the games are described below.
Game G1: Defined similar to G0 except for a modification to the Encrypt algo-
rithm. Elements from the master secret keyMSK are used instead of the public
parameters to generate the challenge ciphertext.
(ĉtagi)
n
i=2, s
U←− Zp,
C1 = sP1, C2 = sbP1,
C0 = mβ · (C1, P2)α1e(C2, P2)α2 ,
for i = 2, . . . , n,
C3,i =
(
− x̂β,i
x̂β,1
u1,1 + u1,i + ctagiw1
)
C1 +
(
− x̂β,i
x̂β,1
u2,1 + u2,i + ctagiw2
)
C2 .
It is not hard to see that C0 and C3 are well-formed. The change we have made
is only conceptual and hence G1 is identical to G0. We have
Pr[X0] = Pr[X1]. (5)
Game G2: The challenge ciphertext generation in G1 is changed to generate C1
as C1
U←− G1. We can show that an adversary capable of detecting this change
can be used to solve DDH1. In other words, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. |Pr[X1]− Pr[X2]| ≤ εDDH1.
It is a rather straightforward reduction wherein we embed the DDH1 challenge
in C1. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1 and hence we skip it.
Game G3,0: We arrive at G3,0 by modifying the setup, key generation and
encryption procedures in G2 as follows.
Setup: The public parameters are generated as follows. Choose P1
U←− G×1 ,
P2
U←− G×2 , α, α1, w, w1
U←− Zp, b
U←− Z×p , u,v1,v2
U←− Znp and compute
u1 = v1+w1v2, gT = e(P1, P2)
α. The algorithm implicitly sets u2 = b
−1(u−
u1), w2 = b
−1(w −w1) and α2 = b−1(α− α1). The parameters are given by
PP = (P1, bP1,uP1, wP1, gT ).
Key Generation: On input a vector y, the KeyGen algorithm is modified to
create the components of SKy as shown below.
r
U←− Zp,
K1 = rP2,
K2 = (α1 + r〈y,v1〉)P2 + 〈y,v2〉K4, K3 = b−1 ((α+ r〈y,u〉)P2 −K2)
K4 = rw1P2, K5 = b
−1(rwP2 −K4).
Encryption: The Encrypt algorithm is modified to use public parameters in-
stead of elements from the master secret (as in the construction). The chal-
lenge ciphertext is generated by a call to the SFEncrypt algorithm. Essen-
tially, the components of Ĉ are generated as follows.
(ĉtagi)
n
i=2, s, µ
U←− Zp,
C0 = mβ · (gT )se(P1, P2)µα1 ,
C1 = sP1 + µP1, C2 = sbP1,
for i = 2, . . . , n,
C3,i = s
(
− x̂β,ix̂β,1u1 + ui + ĉtagiw
)
P1 + µ
(
− x̂β,ix̂β,1u1,1 + u1,i + ĉtagiw1
)
P1.
The modifications are purely conceptual and so game G3,0 is identical to G2. We
have
Pr[X2] = Pr[X3,0]. (6)
Game G3,k (for k = 1, . . . , q): Let y1, . . . ,yq be the vectors queried by A .
This game is identical to G3,k−1 except for the following two modifications. The
(k − 1)-st key is generated according to the SFKeyGen algorithm and SKyk for
the k-th vector yk is generated differently – component K2 of SKyk is now
chosen uniformly at random from G2. The first change is purely conceptual and
hence does not affect the adversary’s behaviour in any way. We show that if the
adversary can detect the second modification, then the DDH2 problem can be
solved. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 4. |Pr[X3,k−1]− Pr[X3,k]| ≤ εDDH2 for all k ∈ [1, q].
G4: Proceeds identical to G3,q but for one difference – the secret key corre-
sponding to yq is computed using the SFKeyGen algorithm. Since this is only a
conceptual change, we have
Pr[X3,q] = Pr[X4]. (7)
Game G5: We arrive at this game from G4 by modifying the setup and semi-
functional key generation algorithms.
Setup: The public parameters are generated as follows. Choose P1
U←− G×1 ,
P2
U←− G×2 , α, α1, w, w1
U←− Zp, b
U←− Z×p , u,u1
U←− Znp and compute gT =
e(P1, P2)
α. The algorithm implicitly sets u2 = b
−1(u−u1), w2 = b−1(w−w1)
and α2 = b
−1(α− α1) and outputs PP = (P1, bP1,uP1, wP1, gT ).
Key Generation: Let y be the input to SFKeyGen.
r, π′, γ′
U←− Zp,
K1 = rP2,
K2 = π
′P2, K3 = b
−1 ((α+ r〈y,u〉)P2 −K2),
K4 = γ
′P2, K5 = b
−1 ((α+ rw)P2 −K4)
The rest of the secret key components are generated as in G3,0.
The reduction implicitly sets γ′ = α1 + r〈y,u1〉P2 + πγ, thus fixing π. The rest
of the components are consistent with K2. If γ 6= 0, π is uniformly distributed
in Zp by the choice of γ′. Note that even if γ = 0, π can take any value from Zp
uniformly at random. Hence the keys are correctly distributed.
Since the change is only conceptual, we have,
|Pr[X4]− Pr[X5]| ≤ (1/p). (8)
Now consider the challenge ciphertext. All keys are computed independent of
α1,u1, w1 and so are the public parameters. As a result, in the adversary’s view,
e(P1, P2)
µα1 is randomly distributed in GT as long as µ 6= 0 which happens with
probability at most 1/p. The semi-functional components of C3,i, i ∈ [2, n] are
determined by the following matrix-vector product.
x̂β,2/x̂β,1 1 0 · · · 0
x̂β,3/x̂β,1 0 1 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
x̂β,n/x̂β,1 0 0 · · · 1


u1,1
u1,2
...
u1,n
 .
The rank of the matrix is n − 1 and hence the semi-functional components are
uniformly distributed in the adversary’s view (given that u1
U←− Znp and µ 6= 0).
Based on the discussion above we can say that in game G5, all components
involving the message mβ and the attribute vector x̂xβ are randomly distributed.
Hence the bit β is information theoretically hidden from the adversary. The
probability that A wins in G5 is exactly 1/2. Therefore, from Lemmas 3, 4 and
equations (5), (6), (7) and (8), we have
ε =
∣∣∣∣Pr[X0]− 12
∣∣∣∣
= |Pr[X0]− Pr[X5]|
≤ |Pr[X0]− Pr[X1]|+ |Pr[X1]− Pr[X2]|+ |Pr[X2]− Pr[X3, 0]|
+
(
q∑
k=1
|Pr[X3,k−1]− Pr[X3,k]|
)
+ |Pr[X3,q]− Pr[X4]|+ |Pr[X4]− Pr[X5]|
≤ εDDH1 + q · εDDH2 + (1/p)
ut
Proof (of Lemma 4). If the attacker can distinguish between the two games
G3,k−1 and G3,k, then we show how to build an algorithm B that solves the
DDH2 problem. Let (G, P2, rP2, w1P2, (rw1 + γ)P2) be an instance of DDH2
provided to B whose task is to determine whether γ = 0 or γ
U←− Zp. The
different phases of the game are simulated as follows.
Setup: Choose P1
U←− G×1 , α, α1, w, w1
U←− Zp, b
U←− Z×p , u,v1,v2
U←− Znp and
compute u1P2 = v1P2 + v2(w1P2), gT = e(P1, P2)
α. The algorithm implicitly
sets u2 = b
−1(u−u1), w2 = b−1(w−w1) and α2 = b−1(α−α1). The parameters
are given by PP = (P1, bP1,uP1, wP1, gT ). Note that PP can be generated
without the knowledge of u1 or w1.
Key Generation: Denote by y1, . . . ,yq the vectors queried by A . Normal keys
can be generated as in G3,0. For j = 1, . . . , q, key SKyj is generated as follows.
Case j < k: Use SFKeyGen to generate SKyj . This is possible since b is known
to B.
Case j = k: Create the key SKyk = (K1,K2,K3,K4,K5) as follows. Let yk =
(y1, . . . , yn).
Pick r
U←− Zp and set,
K1 = rP2,
K2 = (α1 + r〈y,v1〉)P2 + 〈y,v2〉K4, K3 = b−1 ((α+ r〈y,u〉)P2 −K2)
K4 = (rw1 + γ)P2, K5 = b
−1 (rwP2 −K4).
Components of SKyk are generated exactly as in game G3,0 except that the
DDH2 challenge is embedded in K4.
Case j > k: B computes a normal key according to the KeyGen algorithm.
Challenge Phase: A provides two messages m0,m1 and two vectors x̂0 =
(x̂0,1, . . . , x̂0,n), x̂1 = (x̂1,1, . . . , x̂1,n). B picks β
U←− {0, 1} and generates the
challenge ciphertext Ĉ = (C0, C1, C2, (C3,i, ĉtagi)ni=2) as follows.
Pick s, µ
U←− Zp and set,
ĉtagi =
x̂β,i
x̂β,1
v2,1 − v2,i,
C0 = mβ · (gT )se(P1, P2)µα1 ,
C1 = sP1 + µP1, C2 = sbP1,
for i = 2, . . . , n,
C3,i = s
(
− x̂β,ix̂β,1u1 + ui + ĉtagiw
)
P1 + µ
(
− x̂β,ix̂β,1 v1,1 + v1,i
)
P1 .
The choice of tags above enables us to create the semi-functional component
without the knowledge of w1. Essentially we cancel out the v2 component of
hash (computed using u1 = v1 + w1v2) by choosing the corresponding tag for
w1-component appropriately. We stress that this is the only way to create a
semi-functional ciphertext.
If γ = 0, k-th key is distributed as in G3,k−1; otherwise γ
U←− Zp and SKyk is
distributed as a semi-functional key with randomiser γ coming from the DDH2
challenge and π = 〈x,v2〉. Now, suppose that B tries to create a ciphertext for a
vector x that is orthogonal to yk, it can only do so by setting ctagi =
xi
x1
v2,1−v2,i.
This implies that
ctag =
n∑
i=2
yictagi
=
n∑
i=2
yi((xi/x1)v2,1 − v2,i)
= (v2,1/x1)
n∑
i=2
xiyi −
n∑
i=2
yiv2,i
= (v2,1/x1)(〈x,y〉 − x1y1)− (〈v2,y〉 − v2,1y1)
= −〈v2,y〉,
which is equal to −π, which is precisely the requirement for the ciphertext and
key to be nominally semi-functional. Decryption succeeds and B obtains no
information about whether or not SKyk is semi-functional.
We now show that the view of the adversary is perfectly simulated by B.
The public parameters are distributed as in the real scheme. Randomisers for
the keys and ciphertexts including their semi-functional components have the
correct distribution. We only need to show that all the n− 1 tags, (ĉtagi)ni=2 of
the challenge ciphertext and π for the k-th secret key – generated using v2, are
randomly distributed in Zp.

π
ĉtag2
...
ĉtagn
 =

y1 y2 y3 · · · yn
x̂β,2/x̂β,1 −1 0 · · · 0
x̂β,3/x̂β,1 0 −1 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
x̂β,n/x̂β,1 0 0 · · · −1


v2,1
v2,2
...
v2,n

From the above equation, one can say that the tags and π have uniform and
independent distributions over Zp in A ’s view iff
– v2 is information theoretically hidden in A ’s view and uniformly distributed
in Znp ,
– the matrix is invertible.
The first condition is naturally satisfied as no encodings of v2 in either G1 or G2
are revealed in the public parameters. The second condition also holds since the
determinant of the matrix is (−1)n〈x̂,yk〉/x̂β,1 which is clearly non-zero due to
the restriction on A ’s queries requiring 〈x̂,yk〉 6= 0. Therefore, the simulation is
perfect. ut
C Application to Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption
We explain how to derive an identity-based encryption scheme (IBBE) that has
sub-linear sized ciphertexts and keys. In an IBBE scheme, each user is associated
with an identity id ∈ I (I denotes the domain of identities). There is a central
authority called the private key generator (PKG) that generates and distributes
keys for all users securely. The secret key corresponding to a user with identity
id is denoted SKid. A sender can broadcast an encrypted message (as in IPE, the
parameters of the PKG are used for encryption) to all users of the system. The
message however is only intended for a subset S = {id1, . . . , id`} of users that we
refer to as privileged. Naturally, this requires the ciphertext to be constructed
in a manner that allows only a legitimate/privileged user to decrypt. In other
words, only a user with identity id with id ∈ S can decrypt the ciphertext using
SKid.
An IBBE can be expressed as a special case of inner product encryption.
We only provide the top-level idea and skip the details. As our constructions
are based on bilinear groups of prime order p, let the domain of attributes and
identities to be Zp. We now show that an IPE scheme supporting inner products
over Zn+1p can be specialised to an IBBE scheme where the number of intended
recipients of a broadcast is upper bounded by n. Consider a particular set S =
{id1, . . . , id`} with ` ≤ n. Define the polynomial pS(z) =
∏`
i=1(z − idi) ∈ Zp[z]
and compute x = (x0, . . . , xn), the vector of coefficients of 1, z, z
2, . . . , zn in
pS(z). Since the degree of the polynomial is `, xj = 0 for all j > `. The ciphertext
is encrypted to the attribute vector x as in the Encrypt alrogithm of the IPE. The
secret key for an identity id is constructed as follows: let y = (1, id, id2, . . . , idn);
create a key for the vector y using the IPE KeyGen algorithm. If id ∈ S, then
clearly id is a root of pS(z) and hence 〈y,x〉 = x0+ idx1+ id2x2+ · · ·+ idnxn = 0.
The converse also holds.
Following the method outlined above, we can derive a constant-size ciphertext
IBBE from IPE1 with ciphertext size being 3|G1| + |Zp| + |GT | (recall that |G|
is the size of representation of an element from G). Size of a key would be
(2n+3)|G2|+n|Zp|. Similarly, the scheme IPE2 leads to an IBBE with constant-
size keys (of size 5|G2|) and ciphertext of size (n + 2)|G1| + n|Zp| + |GT |. In
addition this scheme is anonymous i.e., decryption can be performed without
knowing the set for which the ciphertext was encrypted to. Furthermore, unlike
many anonymous broadcast encryption schemes, decryption time is constant
(independent of ` and n).
In the IBBE obtained from IPE1, the linear dependence of key size on n is
rather impractical in certain scenarios, for instance, when the user keys are actu-
ally stored in smartcards. On the other hand, ciphertext size also contributes to
the communication overhead and longer ciphertexts consume larger bandwidth.
So, IPE2 ciphertexts indeed eat up larger bandwidth. Also, these ciphertexts
grow linearly in n, unlike the construction in [RS14a] where the ciphertext size
varies with ` (≤ n). In order to strike a balance between the two, we propose sim-
ple scheme built upon IPE1 that achieves a reasonable trade-off. Note that we no
longer aim for ciphertext anonymity. A high-level overview of this construction
is provided below.
As earlier, let n denote the maximum number of privileged recipients of
a broadcast and assume for simplicity that n = n1n2. Setup IPE1 for inner
products over Zn1+1p . The encryption algorithm partitions the input set S =
{id1, . . . , id`} into `2(≤ n2) subsets S1, . . . , S`2 with |S1| = |S2| = · · · = |S`2−1| =
n1 and |S`2 | = `1(≤ n1). Then perform separate IPE2-encryptions of the message
for each of the sets. Secret keys are generated as in IPE2. Let pSi(z) denote the
polynomial corresponding to set Si (for i ∈ [1, `2]) and xi the corresponding
coefficient vector. Let y denote the vector associated to the secret key for id. Now,
any id ∈ S is present exactly in one of the subsets, say Sj implying that 〈xj ,y〉 =
0 and 〈xi,y〉 6= 0 for i ∈ [1, `2]\{j}. The decryption algorithm can simply choose
the subset to which id belongs and decrypt the IPE2-ciphertext corresponding
to that set. On evaluating the efficiency of this scheme, we find that ciphertexts
are of size `2(3|G1|+ |Zp|+ |GT |) and the key size is (2n1 + 3)|G1|+n1|Zp|. This
provides a nice trade-off among the public parameters, ciphertext and key sizes.
Choosing n1 and n2 to be about sqrtn, we obtain an IBBE scheme with public
parameters, ciphertexts and keys, all with O(
√
n)-size, which is sublinear in n.
